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THE RUDIMENTS OF STATE LEVEL JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
JAMES A. GAZELL, PH.D.*
The author contends that judicial management at the state level is
a neglected sector of political science, even though the magnitude, the
output, and the public policy impact of state trial courts have assumed
growing significance. The study of judicial management entails an ex-
amination of at least seven principal facets: judicial organization (or
consolidation), the abolition of fee offices, judicial leadership, court
congestion, staff functions, judicial selection and tenure, and judicial
discipline, removal, and retirement. In his conclusion the author argues
that the study of judicial management may constitute a discipline in
itself and that this sector faces an extensive research agenda.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE SCHOLARLY STUDY of judicial management is mainly the func.tion of three professions: law, political science, and public adminis-
tration. However, experts in these fields have tended to neglect this
sector which is beginning to burgeon at the confluence of these disci-
plines. First, within the legal profession, specialists in constitutional
law have usually devoted almost exclusive attention to the study of
substantive and procedural case law and have generally ignored the
managerial problems of judicial organizations at all levels. Lawyers
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and judges may often be too immersed in their daily work to explore
this area meticulously. Second, within political science, constitutional
law analysts also share the case law preoccupation of their counterparts
in the legal profession.' Third, within public administration, research-
ers have usually centered their attention on four facets of this profes-
sion: administrative law, fiscal administration, organizational theory,
and personnel administration.2 In examining this neglected sector at
the state level, one may focus on the following areas: its neglect by
scholars in these three professions, its growing significance, its princi-
pal facets, and its prospects.
II. THE NEGLECT OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
BY POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
One may measure the neglect of judicial management by these
scholars in at least three ways. First, in the International Index to Peri-
odical Literature (I.I.P.L.) and in the Social Sciences and Humanities
Index (S.S.H.I.), between 1910 and December 1969, the author found
only thirty-two articles directly germane to this sector. This output
averages approximately one article every two years. Of these thirty-two
articles, eighteen (62.1%.) were published since 1950 and indicate
that even the sparse interest in this area is recent.8 Furthermore, of
these thirty-two articles, only seven were published in the major jour-
nals of political science.4
Second, in the Public Affairs Information Service (P.A.I.S.) dur-
ing the same fifty-nine year period, the author uncovered 103 articles
1 A check of the International Index to Periodical Literature and the Social Sciences
and Humanities Index reveals that between 1907 and December of 1969, only seven articles
focusing mainly on judicial management have been published in the major journals of
political science: Walter F. Murphy, Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court Bureaucracy:
A Study in Judicial Administration, 34 J. Pol. 453-476 (Aug. 1962); Walter F. Murphy,
Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 1017-1031 (Dec. 1959) ;
William J. Jameson, Current Problems Affecting the Judicial Branch, 11 W. Pol. Q. 713-723
(Sept. 1958); Wendell G. Schaffer, Management in the Judiciary, 13 Pub. Ad. R. 89-96
(Spr. 1953) ; Edson R. Sunderland, The Judicial Council as an Aid to the Administration
of Justice, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 905-933 (Oct. 1941) ; Pressly S. Sikes, The Work of Judicial
Councils, 29 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 456-472 (June 1935); Rasmus S. Saby, Simplified Procedure
in Municipal Courts, 18 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 760-772.
2 The only article in a public administration journal centering on judicial management
is the following: Wendell G. Schaeffer, Management in the Judiciary, 13 Pub. Ad. R. 89-96
(Spr. 1953).
8 Derived from the 1-18 Int. In. Per. Lit. (1907-Mar. 1965) ; 19-22 Soc. Sci. & Hum. In.
(Apr. 1965-Dec. 1969).
4 Supra n.1.
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which focused directly on judicial management.' This output averages
about two articles a year. In this source, the author found more than
three times as many articles on judicial management than in the first
two sources mainly because P.A.I.S. indexes an average of approxi-
mately five times as many periodicals as does I.I.P.L. or S.S.H.I.6
Furthermore, unlike the first two sources, P.A.I.S. cites an overwhelm-
ing number of articles (89.3%) from legal journals because it has
indexed far more legal periodicals than have the other two sources.'
Third, the Index to Legal Periodicals (I.L.P.) and the Index to
Legal Periodical Literature (I.L.P.L.) contain the bulk (98.0%) of the
articles in judicial management published between 1910 and 1969 and
signify that this sector has been an almost exclusive preoccupation of
the legal profession. However, even in this profession, interest in ju-
dicial management has increased sharply only since 1950; for 62.2%
of all articles on this subject listed in I.L.P. and I.L.P.L. have been
published since that date. (See Fig. 1.) Finally, the author formed a
composite picture of the output in this sector by eliminating the dupli-
cated citations and by examining all the above mentioned indices under
the following titles: administration of justice, courts, judges, judicial
councils, and justice. (See Fig. 1.)
Fla. 1
AN OVERVIEW OF INDEXED ARTICLES ON JUDICIAL MANAGEMENTS
Political
Legal Science Miscellaneous
Years Journals Journals Journals Total
1960-1969 405 (29.5%) 3 (16.7%) 2 (20%) 413
1950-1959 462 (33.7%) 8 (45.5%) 3 (30%) 473
1940-1949 136 ( 9.9%) 2 (11.1%) 1 (10%) 140
1930-1939 224 (16.3%) 1 (5.5%) 3 (30%) 228
1920-1929 106 ( 7.7%) 1 (5.5%) 1 (10%) 109
1910-1919 39 ( 2.9%) 3 (16.7%) 0 ( 0%) 42
Totals 1,372 (100.0%) 18 (100.0%) 10 (100%) 1,400
(98.0%) (1.3%) (0.7%) (100%)
5 Derived from 1-54 Pub. AfH. Info. S. (1915-Dec. 1969).
6 Supra n.3 and n.5. In 1969, P.A.I.S. listed 971 journals; I.L.P. and I.L.P.L. and
S.S.HI., 210. Their respective mean listing between 1890 and 1969 were 850, 167, and 173.
7 Of the 32 journals in P.A.I.S. (1969) citing articles on judicial management, 27
(84.4%) are legal journals; 3 (9.4%), political science journals; and 2 (6.2%), miscel-
laneous journals.
8 Derived from 1-15 In. Leg. Per. (1926-Dec. 1969); 4-6 In. Leg. Per. Lit. (1908-1937);
1-18 Int. In. Per. Lit. (1907-Mar. 1965); 19-22 Soc. Sci. & Hum. In. (1965-1969); 1-34
Pub. AfE. Info. S. (1915-1969).
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III. THE GROWING SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
Until recently the study of judicial management has stood beyond
the customary scope of law, political science, and public administration
even though its subject matter cuts across these professions, and even
though federal and state courts have been huge, costly institutions since
the early 1900's.9 At least four possible reasons may largely account
for the neglect of this sector by specialists in these three fields. One
possible explanation is that they may have regarded this area as the
exclusive province of the legal profession because it originated there.'
A second possible reason is that the preoccupation of these scholars
with the familiar aspects of their discipline may have sapped their
inclination to enlarge its purview. A third possible explanation is that
they may have subconsciously tended to regard judicial organizations
as more ethereal than other public organizations and to forget that courts
face the same kinds of management problems-such as accountability,
authority, budgeting, communications, decision making, leadership,
personnel, small groups, and training. These researchers have been
slow to treat courts as mundane bureaucracies rather than as celestial
organizations run by high priests in black robes." A fourth possible
reason is supplied by one expert, Kenneth Dolbeare, who asserts
that through the years primary concentration [by scholars] was on the
doctrinal results of court action and . . . this emphasis tends to lead
toward a focus on the highest court in the land. The development of
interest in other levels of judicial activity is a by-product of the be-
havioral revolution in public law in which the key questions become:
What are men in government doing? Why? What difference does it
make? The resulting thrust toward process and function leads toward
a more inclusive interest which spans all levels of courts .... 12
During the last six years, at least five transitory factors have made
the study of judicial management more topical for specialists. These
factors were the large-scale prosecutions of San Francisco civil rights
9 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice, 46 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 62-63 (Aug. 1962) ; Samuel B. Clarke, What May Be
Done to Enable the Courts to Allay the Present Discontent with the Administration of Jus-
tice, 50 Am. L. Rev. 161-195 (Mar. 1916).
10 Pound, supra n.9 at 62.
11 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, 34 (1963); Jerome Frank, Courts on
Trial: The Myth and Reality in American Justice, 254-261 (1967); Walter F. Murphy,
Elements of Judicial Strategy 13 (1964); Glendon A. Schubert, Constitutional Politics 8-9
(1960).
12 Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Trial Courts in Urban Politics, 8-9 (1967). For a similar
explanation, see James R. Klonoski and Robert I. Mendelsohn, Introduction, The Politics
of Local Justice xiv (J. Klonoski and R. Mendelsohn ed. 1970).
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demonstrators in 196418 and the mass indictments of Berkeley protest-
ers in 1965,1" which publicized the grave shortcomings of judicial
organizations, especially their dependence on guilty pleas in order to
continue operations.' 5 The remaining three factors were the Report of
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in 1967," the
Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice in 1968,11 and the Skolnick Report to the
President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence in
1969,"8 which castigated trial court operations on numerous grounds:
the common use of bail as a preventive-detention device; delayed
arraignments; a lack of numerous, skilled defense lawyers; the incon-
sistent sentencing of defendants convicted of the same offenses; cumber-
some procedures; and a tendency to become adjuncts rather than
overseers of local law enforcement agencies.
However, the increasing topicality of judicial management for
researchers rests mainly on at least three enduring considerations.
First, the state trial court structures, especially their management
problems, deserve meticulous attention because of their sheer magni-
tude; for they easily dwarf the state appellate systems as well as the
entire federal judiciary. 9 Such trial courts employ thousands of judges
and staff personnel, handle millions of criminal and civil cases each
year,2" and expend several hundred million dollars annually.2 Fur-
thermore, the size of such systems derives from their position as the
13 Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass Production, The
Courts, The Public, and the Law Explosion 106-111 (Jones ed. 1965).
14 Wallace Turner, Berkeley Groups Report on Fight, The New York Times, Jan. 6,
1965, at 29; Coast Students Waive Jury; Savio Given a 2-Day Term, The New York Times,
Mar. 3, 1965 at 13; Lawrence E. Davies, Trial Starts for 155 in Berkeley Sit-In. The New
York Times, Apr. 2, 1965 at 71; Wallace Turner, Many at Berkeley Sit-In Trial Spurn
Probation Bid, The New York Times, July 20, 1965 at 13; Lawrence E. Davies, Berkeley Rally
Denounces Judge, The New York Times, July 30, 1965 at 54.
15 Supra n.13 at 110-111.
16 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The Report of the National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders 340, 341-344 (1968).
17 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,
the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 379-380 (1968).
18 Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest 313-316 (1969).
19 Dolbeare, supra n.12 at 2. The Politics of Local Justice, supra n.12 at 3; Herbert
Jacob, Justice in America 17-25 (1965) ; Richard A. Watson and Rondal G. Downing, The
Politics of the Bench and the Bar 2 (1969).
20 Institute of Judicial Administration, Calendar Status Study-1969. State Trial
Courts of General Jurisdiction Personal Injury Cases, August 1, 1969 vi-ix (1969); Abra-
ham S. Blumberg, Criminal Justice 55-58, 122-123 (1969) ; supra n.13 at 107-108, 111.
21 Institute of Judicial Administration, State and Local Financing of the Courts
(Tentative Report) 8, 11 (1969).
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starting and terminal points of most litigation.22 Because extensive time,
money, and effort are necessary, very few decisions are appealed.
Second, such systems, largely because of their size, generate serious
interest in their efficiency and output.23 In particular, scholars need to
explore how numerous devices may promote greater court efficiency
(as measured by the speedier termination of litigation).24 Third, such
courts are worthy of scholarly investigation because of their pervasive
impact on public policy. Such courts usually constitute an integral
segment of the local political system and, by their decisions in civil and
criminal cases, often make critical reallocations of power within that
system. As Dolbeare states, "the local trial court is ... one of several
institutions affecting the who gets what, when, and how of local politics
.... ,25 This impact runs deeper in urban areas because grave public
policy issues more often come before the trial courts. Moreover, en-
hancing this impact is the discretion of their judges in construing and
applying upper court doctrines, in effecting their own procedures, and
in regulating their own workloads.2" However, scholars James R. Klo-
noski and Robert I. Mendelsohn note that typically "the student of
judicial administration makes little attempt to study the relationship
between the political, social, and economic environments and the oper-
ation of the legal system."27
IV. SEVEN PRINCIPAL FACETS OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
A study of judicial management entails consideration of at least
seven principal facets: court organization (or consolidation); the
abolition of fee offices (mainly justices of the peace); judicial leader-
ship; court congestion (or delay); staff functions; judicial selection
and tenure; and judicial discipline, removal, and retirement. Because
there is no consensus about the parameters of this field, this typology
is a synthesis of germane rubrics gleaned from some standard works2
22 Watson and Downing, supra n.19 at 2; Dolbeare, supra n.12 at 2.3; J. Frank, Courts
on Trial, supra n.11 at 254-261.
23 Maurice Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, The
Courts, The Public, and the Law Explosion, supra n.13 at 56-58.
24 Id. at 57.
25 Dolbeare, supra n.11 at 3.
26 Id. at 2-3.
27 Klonoski and Mendelsohm, The Allocation of Justice: A Political Approach, The
Politics of Local Justice, supra n.12 at 7.
28 American Bar Association, The Improvement of the Administration of Justice
vii-xii (4th ed. 1961); Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Adminis.
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and some recent symposia in this area.29 Let us now turn to the first
main aspect: court organization.
1. Judicial Organization (or Consolidation):
The Framework for Management
Judicial organization is considered first because it sets the frame-
work for judicial management on a systemic rather than an individual-
istic basis. Such organization, synonymous with consolidation, entails
the replacement of numerous, independent trial courts with overlapping
jurisdictions by a single court with comprehensive, exclusive, original
jurisdiction.' (See Fig. 2.) Despite a consensus on its efficacy, such
consolidation has proceeded along two complementary tributaries.
Supreme Court Court Administrator's
(Chief Justice) Office
II
Appellate Courts
Trial Courts Administrative Director
(Chief Judges) of each Trial Court
FIG. 2
A TYPICAL CONSOLIDATED STATE COURT SYSTEM31
First, twenty states have so far consolidated their trial courts but have
let such courts operate without extensive management by the state su-
preme court (or its chief justice) . 2 Each consolidated trial court re-
ceives its direction solely or mainly from its chief judge. (See Fig. 3.)
Second, fourteen states not only have consolidated their trial courts to
date but also have subjected them to supervision by the state supreme
tration vii-xii (1949); Selected Readings on Administration of Justice and Its Improve-
ment v-vi (G. Winters and S. Sunwald ed. 1966).
29 A Symposium: Judicial Administration, 4 Will. LJ. 1-103 (Spr. 1966) ; A Symposium,
44 Tex. L. Rev. 1063-1178 (June 1966); A Symposium: Social Science Approaches to the
Judicial Process, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1551-1628 (June 1966); Special Issue-Court Adminis-
tration, 50 Jud. 256-260 (Apr. 1967).
80 Pound, supra n.8 at 62; Roscoe Pound, Organization of Courts, 11 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y
78 (October 1927).
81 Derived from Ill. Const. art. VIX, H 1, 2, 4, 6, 8.
32 Council on State Government, The Book of the States 1968-1969 118 (1968).
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court (or its chief justice), which manages the entire state court system
through its staff agency, the court administrator's office. -3 (See Fig.
2-3.)
Both kinds of consolidation have moved state judicial organiza-
tions in differing degrees toward the achievement of at least three sig-
nificant objectives.34 One aim has been to reduce trial court congestion,
Fie. 3
STEPS TOWARD JUDICIAL CONSOLIDATION IN THE STATES: 196935
Step 2: Step 4:
Abolition of Inclusion of Con-
Step 1: Justices of the Step 3: solidated Trial
States with Court Peace or Their Consolidation of Courts into State-
Administrator's Judicial Trial Courts wide Unified
Year Offices Functions per se Court System
1925-1929 1 0 0 0
1930-1934 0 0 0 0
1935-1939 1 1 0 0
1940-1944 1 0 0 0
1945-1949 1 2 1 1
1950-1954 6 1 1 1
1955-1959 11 8 5 3
1960-1964 5 10 9 7
1965-1969 9 6 4 3
Total States: 35 28 20 15
which was worsening partly because plaintiffs often filed their cases in
two or more trial courts simultaneously. Frequently, plaintiffs did not
know which court could hear their cases first. A second objective was
to reduce the number of cases where plaintiffs often failed to receive
decisions on the merits of their claims solely because they had filed
complaints in the wrong court. A third aim was to promote uniform
procedures in all trial courts.8 However, so far there is no empirical
evidence correlating backlog reductions with consolidation.
2. The Abolition of Fee Offices: The Complement
of Judicial Organization
Although a political scientist might treat the abolition of fee of-
fices (such as justices of the peace, police magistrates, and constables
83 Id. at 103-104, 118.
84 Kenneth N. Vines, Courts as Political and Governmental Agencies, Politics in the
American States 247 (H. Jacob and K. Vines ed. 1965).
85 Derived from supra n.32 at 103-104, 118. This chart is-not represented as a Guttman
scale because of its fairly low coefficient of reproducibility (0.75), which is well below the
currently accepted minimum of 0.90. See Lee F. Anderson: Meredith W. Watts Jr.: and
Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis 112 (1966).
86 Supra n.17 at 322-323; supra n.16 at 337.338.
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at the state level and United States commissioners at the national level)
as a segment of judicial organization, this area is large enough to be
considered separately. A consensus about the role of fee officers in
judicial organizations has existed among lawyers for many years. The
consensus is that such offices (most of which are justices of the peace)
should be abolished and that their duties should be absorbed by con-
solidated trial courts. At least three considerations underlie this posi-
tion. First, such officers often keep few, if any, records; fewer litigants
bringing them business; and lack consistently fair procedures. Second,
such officers are generally not licensed attorneys and thus lack even the
most rudimentary qualification for holding their positions. Finally,
these officers tend to aggravate the backlogs in the trial courts of record
because retrials (trials de novo) are often necessary on appeal from
decisions by such officers."7
So far twenty-eight states have abolished their fee offices or the
judicial functions of them. (See Fig. 3.) Fifteen have eliminated this
office entirely whereas the remaining thirteen have continued only the
non-judicial functions of these offices."8 However, the advantage of
terminating such offices is undermined by engrafting some of their
officers into newly consolidated trial court systems. For example, in
1964, Illinois fee officers were allowed to become magistrates in the
consolidated circuit courts and to hear minor criminal and civil cases.89
Nonetheless, the elimination of such former officers are now supervised
by a chief judge in each circuit, who can replace them if he and the
circuit judges want to do so."
3. Judicial Leadership: Functions, Problems, and Powers
A third facet of judicial management is the exercise of leadership
by two line authorities: the chief justice at the state level and the chief
judges at the local level. Scholars have tended to focus most of their
attention on executive leadership in the public and private sectors and
have virtually ignored judicial leadership."1 Only within the last few
37 Id.; Herbert Jacob, The Courts as Political Agencies--an Historical Analysis, Studies
in Judicial Politics. Tulane Studies in Political Science 45-46 (K Vines and H. Jacob ed.
1962) ; Jacob, Justice in America, supra n.19 at 139.
88 Supra n.32 at 103-104, 118.
39 Ill. Const. art. VI, § 4(e) (1870); IMi. Pub. L. 1167-1168 (1963).
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Leonard Sayles, Managerial Behavior: Administration in Complex Organi-
zations 33-45 (1964); Peter F. Drucker, The Effective Executive 9-24 (1967); Richard E.
Neustadt, Presidential Power 22 (1964) ; Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration 22-26
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years have researchers begun to delineate, albeit impressionistically,
some of the functions that such executives carry out or should per-
form4" and to recommend programs to train such managers." Perhaps
the main reason for this neglect is that, until the states began to con-
solidate their judicial bureaucracies, the multiplicity of independent
trial courts made the opportunities for such leadership rare. However,
because of such consolidations, judicial executives have been created
at the supreme court and trial court levels." These executives are be-
ginning to operate judicial organizations as if they were the same as
other bureaucracies because the former are becoming increasingly
analogous to the latter.4 The state supreme court is assuming the role
of top management with the chief justice as chairman of the board of
justices and with the court administrator's office as the staff arm of the
board. The appellate courts are beginning to resemble middle manage-
ment. The chief judges of the trial courts are starting to constitute
supervisory management over a labor force of judges, associate judges,
magistrates, clerks, attorneys, and litigants.4"
In this new ambience both kinds of judicial executives have
started to confront the leadership functions, problems, and powers that
their counterparts in other public-as well as private-organizations
had exercised for many years. Like Barnard's industrial executives,
judicial leaders are beginning to perform such functions as setting out-
put goals, facilitating communications throughout the judicial bureau-
cracy, motivating other justices and judges, and serving as a power
broker among competing factions.4 Moreover, judicial executives face
the broad range of managerial problems that confront other corporate
leaders-such as specializing effectively; delegating authority wisely;
maintaining unity of command; narrowing the span of control; avoid-
ing excessive layering; deciding whether to establish and organize
(1957); Chester . Barnard, The Functions of the Executive 216-217 (1938); Robert T.
Golembiewski, Three Styles of Leadership and Their Uses, 38 Pers. 34-45 (July-Aug. 1961).
42 Edward C. GaUas, The Profession of Court Management, 51 Jud. 334-336 (Apr. 1968).
43 Edward C. Gallas, Create University-Trained Court Managers, 4 Trial 21-22 (Dec.
1967-Jan. 1968).
44 Supra n.32 at 103.
45 John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State 159-168, 176-188 (1967). See
also, Pound, Organization of Courts, supra n.29 at 78; supra n.17 at 380; Arthur T. Vander-
bilt, The Essentials of a Sound Judicial System, 48 NW. U.L. Rev. 13 (Mar., Apr. 1953).
46 Jacob, Justice in America, supra n.19 at 81-82, 139; supra n.27 at 6; Dean Jares
and Robert J. Mendelsohn, The Judicial Role of Sentencing Behavior, 11 NW. J. Pol. Sci.
486-487 (Nov. 1967).
47 Barnard, supra n.41 at 216-217.
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departments, divisions, or districts on the basis of purpose, process,
place, or clientele; using their staff members advantageously; empha-
sizing the judicial budget as an instrument of coordination, control, and
planning; measuring output; using computers for retrieving informa-
tion, for case scheduling, and for maintaining records; striking a bal-
ance between the scientific management and the human relations
approaches to the treatment of subordinates; and handling such house-
keeping operations as the recruitment, training, and supervision of
clerks, secretaries, court reporters, and bailiffs.4" Finally, judicial ex-
ecutives have gained some of the powers wielded by their industrial
counterparts-such as the power to transfer judicial personnel to di-
visions or districts where a backlog is forming or worsening and the
power to discipline judges for handling cases too quickly, too slowly, or
too incompetently by shifting them from one section of the judicial
bureaucracy to another.49 Even though such executives cannot dismiss
their elected line subordinates, they can often force them to resign as a
consequence of an adverse transfer, temporary suspension, or un-
favorable publicity resulting from investigations by their staff agency,
the state or local court administrator's office.
One may cite at least two recent episodes to illustrate the overall
-but uneven-growth of judicial leadership at the state supreme court
and trial court levels:
(1) In 1965 the Illinois General Assembly provided for the com-
pulsory retirement of all justices and judges at age seventy." However,
it was unclear whether this law also included magistrates. In early
August 1967, John S. Boyle (Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, a consolidated trial court) appointed three magistrates,
two of whom were seventy and one who was seventy-one. 5' On August
11, 1967, Chief Justice Roy J. Sofisburg, Jr. (exercising managerial
48 See, e.g., Institute of Public Administration, Papers on the Science of Adminis-
tration 1-45 (L Gulick and L E. Urwick ed. 1937); Herbert A. Simon, Administrative
Behavior 20-44 (2d ed. 1957); Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Manage-
ment 10 (1942); Barnard, supra n.41 at 119, 122; Mary Parker Follett, The New State
5 (1918); William B. Given, Bottom-Up Management: People Working Together 3-4,
10-12 (1949); Alexander R. Heren, Why Men Work 22, 61 (1948); American Bar Associ-
ation, supra n.28 at 12-13. See also n.39 and n.40.
49 Supra n.17 at 379-380.
50 Ill. Pub. L. 1797 (1965).
51 Bar Three Magistrates, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 11, 1967, pt. 1, at 1-2; Magistrates
Plan Return to Other Side of Bench, Chicago's American, Aug. 11, 1967 at 7.
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authority over the entire state judiciary)5" ordered Boyle to remove
these men from their office and to replace them with persons who had
not reached the mandatory retirement age. Sofisburg issued this order
even though he publicly conceded that there was no direct prohibition
in the law against Boyle's action." (See Fig. 4.)
(2) In late 1967 Boyle temporarily suspended two associate
judges-one for setting a large number of unusually low bonds for
persons charged with felonies, the other for setting an extraordinarily
high number of bonds. The resulting adverse publicity induced both
men to resign."
4. Court Congestion (or Delay): A Central Leadership Problem
A fourth facet of judicial management is court congestion, which,
although technically a part of judicial leadership, is extensive enough
to be considered separately. Even though judicial executives perform
numerous significant functions, perhaps their central task is to regulate
the caseload of a court. In most trial courts this regulation becomes a
problem of reducing delay.
There are at least seven common definitions of trial court delay.
One definition equates delay with backlog size.55 However, Zeisel and
his colleagues have castigated this formulation in the following words:
... the cardinal fact about the disposition of cases in our courts is that
only a fraction of the suits reach the trial stage, and it is only at this
stage that they become a serious burden on the court. This is why the
size of the backlog is so frequently a paper figure of limited signifi-
cance. The numerical size of the backlog tells us little unless we also
know the size of the court, the proportion of cases settled before assign-
ment, and the time it takes to dispose of assigned cases. A large back-
log of pending suits may be disposed of quite speedily if the court is
large, or if the average time required for disposition is small, or if a
large proportion of cases is disposed of voluntarily without court action.
And since any or all of these factors may change over time, the nominal
52 Ill. ConSt. art. vi, § 2 (1870).
53 Supra n.51.
54 Ronald Koziol and John Oswald, Judge Ordered Off Bench, Chicago Tribune, May 12,
1967, § 1, at 1; Judge Kizas Quits in Bond Probe, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 15, 1967, § 1, at 1;
Ronald Koziol and John Oswald, Take Murphy Off Bench in Probe of Bail, Chicago Tribune,
May 26, 1967, § 1, at 9; Harry Golden, Jr., Charge Murphy Put Bonds Before Duty,
Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 21, 1967, at 8.
55 Hans Zeisel; Harry Kalven, Jr.; and Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Courts, 43, 45
(1959).
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THE CONSOLIDATED CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY56
backlog is a poor measure of delay even within the same court system.
The backlog may decrease even while the delay increases.57
A second definition identifies delay with the age of the last case sched-
uled to be tried in regular order. However, this formulation is defective
because the proportion of cases where trial courts grant preference or
permit litigants to defer their cases varies greatly among and within
jurisdictions over a long span of time.5" A third definition regards
delay as the average interval between the filing of an action and the
trial.59 A fourth definition (a slight variant of the third) equates delay
51 Derived from Circuit Court of Cook County, Establish Justice: Annual Report of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois 1964, at 5-22 (1965).
57 Supra n.55 at 44.
58 Id. at 45.
59 Supra n.23 at 32.
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with the average time period between answer and trial." Both formu-
lations contain the same alleged flaw as the first definition. A fifth
meaning of delay treats it as the average time lapse between the point
when a case is at issue and the trial."' Under this formulation, court
delay, as measured in months, appears to be far less substantial than
it does under previous definitions. Nonetheless, the fourth and fifth
meanings are used by the Institute of Judicial Administration in gather-
ing congestion statistics from the many trial courts across the nation.62
A sixth definition is simply the average age of all cases reaching trial,
regardless of whether the order is regular or preferred.' This formu-
lation synthesizes the two previous definitions. A seventh meaning of
delay is the average time between the original filing and the termination
of appeal proceedings, if any. 4 This definition embraces relatively few
cases but does imply that delay measurement is a far broader concept
than scholars have generally regarded it.
Because thirty-five states have court administrator's offices to
gather statistics65 and because such information has been funneled since
1953 into the Institute of Judicial Administration 6 for collation into
a national picture of trial court delay, one may readily ascertain the
current seriousness of this problem. Overall, court congestion varies
directly with population. If one accepts the fourth definition of delay,
which is the most common, one may easily perceive this direct vari-
ation. (See Fig. 5.) For counties with a population over 750,000, the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, faces the worst congestion with
Fic. 5
TRIAL COURT DELAY: A NATIONAL VIEW (1969)67
Average Time
in Months from
County Population Answer to Trial Range in Months
Over 750,000 32.2 9.7-59.6
Between 500,000
and 750,000 21.0 4.2-47.3
Under 500,000 13.0 2.4-30.6
60 Institute of Judicial Administration, Calendar Status Study, supra n.20 at ii-iii.
61 Id.; Milton D. Green, The Situation in 1959, 328 Annals 7 (Mar. 1960).
62 Supra n.60 at ii-iii, vi, 4.
63 Supra n.55, at 43, 45.
64 Supra n.23 at 32.
65 Supra n.32 at 118.
66 Supra n.60 at i.
67 Based upon supra n.60 at vi.
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an average delay of 59.6 months. The population of this county in 1960
was 5,129,725. By contrast, the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida,
ranked last with an average delay of 9.7 months. However, the popu-
lation of this county in 1960 was only 935,047. For counties with
populations between 500,000 and 750,000, the Supreme Court of
Suffolk County, New York, has experienced the most congestion with
an average delay of 47.3 months whereas the Court of Common Pleas
for Delaware County, Pennsylvania, faces a nominal delay-an aver-
age of only 4.2 months. The population of both counties is nearly the
same-666,784 and 553,154, respectively, as of 1960. For counties
with populations under 500,000, the worst average delay-30.6 months
-belongs to the Superior Court of Hillsborough, County, New Hamp-
shire. The population of this county in 1960 was 178,161. By contrast,
numerous counties in this category encountered only negligible con-
gestion-an average of 2.4 months.6" Finally, one must remember that
trial court delay is a malady more generally affecting civil rather than
criminal litigation because, in the latter, as Dean Barrett notes, "Con-
stitutional guarantees of 'speedy trial,' and statutory time limits re-
quire relatively speedy handling."6 "
Because trial court congestion has been a serious problem for
many years, proposed solutions-drastic and mild-have abounded.
The numerous suggestions ultimately seek to make the operations of
trial courts considerably more just.7" More specifically, these proposals
contain at least four implicitly normative premises. First, if imple-
mented, the measures should not materially increase the probability of
different outcomes in cases. Second, the proposals should be simple
and inexpensive, compared with the time and money savings effected.
Third, the measures should be straightforward. Finally, the changes
should stress fairness and good faith to the litigants."' However, to
achieve these goals, a judge, as one prominent law professor has com-
mented, "must be politician, administrator, bureaucrat, and lawyer in
order to cope with a crushing calendar of cases."7
Among the most widely advocated proposals for reducing trial
68 Id. at vi-ix.
69 Supra n.13 at 106.
70 Maurice Rosenberg, Forward, in Walter E. Meyer Institute of Law, Dollars, Delay
and the Automobile Victim iv (1968).
71 Supra n.23 at 58.
72 Abraham S. Blumberg, Criminal Justice 122-123 (1967).
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court delay are the following: the abolition of jury trials generally,
the elemination of such trials in personal injury cases, inducements to
increase jury trial waivers (such as by using a comparative rather than
contributory negligence rule in exchange for this waiver), the acceler-
ation of jury trials (such as by a judge assuming more vigorous
charge of it, participating in the questioning of witnesses, curtailing
repetitive testimony, discouraging perfunctory objections), devices to
increase settlements (such as pre-trial conferences, impartial medical
experts, certificates of readiness for trial before docketing cases, and
the payment of interest by losing defendants to encompass the time
from answer to verdict), the reduction of trial scheduling gaps (such
as by changing the system of handling cases from a calendar to an as-
signment basis), stringent supervision by presiding judges, weekly
public reports on individual judicial output, more court days, summer
sessions, longer hours per court day, an enlarged trial bar, more judges,
a leveled court calendar (whereby delay is more equitably distributed
by refusing to accord preference to certain kinds of cases), split trials
(the separation of liability and damage proceedings), compulsory ar-
bitration of small claims, the use of auditors (referees to supplement
judges), and automobile accident compensation plans (modeled after
workman's compensation programs) .7 However, apart from the limited
works of Hans Zeisel and Maurice Rosenberg,74 there have been no
empirical studies assessing the operational merits of these proposals.
73 These proposed antidotes for trial court delay have been called from numerous
sources: supra n.55 at 43-217; supra n.23 at 32-58; Hans Zeisel and Thomas Callahan,
Split-Trials and Time Saving: a Statistical Analysis, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1606-1625 (1963);
Hans Zeisel, Splitting Liability and Damage Issue Saves 20% of Court's Time, 356
A.B.A. Rep. 322-324; Hans Zeisel, Delay by the Parties and Delay by the Courts, 15 J. L.
Ed. 27-33 (1962) ; Hans Ziesel, Court Delay Caused by the Bar? 54 A.B.A.J. 886-888; Hans
Zeisel and Harry Kalven, Jr., Delay in the Court: a Summary View, 15 N.Y.B.A. Rep. 104.
118 (1960); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Bar, the Court, and the Delay, 328 Annals 37-45
(1960); Julius H. Miner, Court Congestion: a New Approach, 45 A.B.A.J. 1265-1268
(1959); Maurice Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: a "Before and
After" Survey, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 89-112 (1959); Maurice Rosenberg, The Pretrial Con-
ference and Effective Justice 87 (1964); Maurice Rosenberg and Robert H. Chanin, Audi-
tors in Massachusetts as Antidotes for Delayed Civil Courts, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 27-56;
Maurice Rosenberg and Myra Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small
Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 448472 (1961); Maurice Rosenberg and
Michael I. Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59 Colum. L.
Rev. 1115-1170 (1959); Samuel H. Hofstadter, A Proposed Automobile Accident Com-
pensation Plan, 328 Annals 53-60 (1960); Bernard Botein, Impartial Medical Testi-
mony, 328 Annals 75-83 (1960); Jacob, Justice in America, supra n.19, at 82-83. For
recent symposia exploring the delay facet, supra n.29.
74 See especially supra n.55 at 43-217, and Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in
Arkansas: a Before and After Survey, supra n.73 at 89-112.
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5. Judicial Staffs: Competitors for Leadership
A fifth facet of judicial management is the role of staffs as facili-
tators of-and as competitors for-judicial leadership. Staffs (com-
monly called court administrator's offices) were created to facilitate
such management. Such offices were established by constitutional pro-
visions or by legislation to furnish the judicial bureaucracy with the
expertise that other large organizations, public and private, had found
necessary because of their growth. 5
Such staffs perform numerous functions that are prerequisites for
efficient judicial leadership, whether exercised mainly by line or staff.
The duties entrusted to such offices include evaluating the organization,
practices, and procedures of the state courts; keeping records and com-
piling data on the cases handled by all state courts; preparing periodic
reports on the disposition of cases by all such courts; making recom-
mendations about the assignment of judges to backlog ridden courts;
preparing and submitting estimates of future judicial expenditures to
the proper budgetary agency of the state government; publishing and
distributing copies of rules and orders to judges and clerks; supervising
clerical personnel and their work; and securing the facilities and equip-
ment needed by the courts. The functions performed by such officers
help to provide the information necessary for the unified direction of
the entire state judicial bureaucracy by the state supreme court (or its
chief justice) and for the improved supervision of the consolidated
trial courts by each chief judge.7" However, the operation of such staffs
at the trial court level may furnish chief judges with the information
needed to resist the overall direction of the state court system by the
staff agency of the highest state court (or its chief justice).
According to the eminent jurist, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the nu-
merous staff duties have enabled judicial executives to compare the
output of all judges; to determine whether a judge's work falls above
or below the mean for his court, division, or district; to assign judges
where they are most or least needed and where their specialized abili-
ties can be most effectively used; and to accelerate the output of all
trial courts.77 Although Vanderbilt implies a high positive correlation
75 Supra n.32 at 103; Galbraith, supra n.45 at 159-168, 176-188.
76 American Judicature Society, Court Administrators: Their Functions, Qualifications
and Salaries, AJS Information Sheet No. 34 (1966).
77 Vanderbilt, supra, n.45 at 13-14.
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between an increased quantity of judicial decisions and their quality,78
one is skeptical; for speedy decisions are not necessarily wise or fair.
The states have witnessed a rapid increase in the number of court
administrator's offices created at the supreme court and trial court
levels. These offices have so far been established at one level or the
other in thirty-five states. In all but three states these offices have been
founded since 1948."9 (See Fig. 3.)
Although Vanderbilt viewed these staff officials as specialists who
augmented the managerial effectiveness of judicial executives, 0 this
assessment may no longer be valid. Such officials may have become
staff competitors for judicial leadership nominally exercised by the
two primary line officials: the chief justice and the chief judge. Such
staff officials may be slowly forming what, according to economist John
Kenneth Galbraith, is a "technostructure"---a body of experts whose
knowledge makes their titular superiors in the hierarchy dependent on
them and hence subordinate to them in fact."z He stresses that techno-
structures arise in all large public and corporate organizations because
the specialized knowledge needed to run them successfully varies di-
rectly with their size."
Because court administrators are experts, they may be gaining
de facto control of state judicial bureaucracies just as the technostruc-
tures dominate other organizations. Chief justices and chief judges may
be experiencing what their counterparts in other bureaucracies have
encountered: a widening gulf between their authority and their power.8 4
Such judicial executives may become increasingly like corporation
presidents who find themselves simplifying decisions reached in the
lower echelons by experts or striking compromises when the experts
disagree among themselves.8 5 Judicial executives may become relegated
78 Id. at 8.
79 Supra n.32 at 118.
so Vanderbilt, supra n.45 at 13-14.
81 Galbraith, supra n.45 at 71.
82 Id. at 71-82.
88 Id. at 81-82.
84 Victor A. Thompson, Modem Organization 4-6 (1961).
85 Galbraith, supra n.45 at 100-103. For an example of a company president (Henry
Ford) who refused to accept relegation to a titular role, see William B. Harris, Ford's Fight
for First, 50 Fortune 123, 126 (1954); Richard E. Roberts, Ford's Reorganization:
The Management Story, 19 Adv. Mang. 9-12; Editors of Fortune, The Executive Life 192
(1956) ; John Kenneth Galbraith, The Liberal Hour 141-144 (1960).
STATE LEVEL JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
to this figurehead position because they need the specialized knowledge
of their staff officials for intelligent policy making and because these
officials determine the range of decisional choices open to such execu-
tives. Thus couxt administrators may be acquiring more line functions;
may be reversing the downward flow of authority; may be providing
judicial leadership themselves instead of merely facilitating it for their
titular superiors; may be assuming more significant decision-making;
and may be turning into enclaves accountable in fact to no one but
themselves. Such changes may be the inevitable concomitants of or-
ganizational growth rather than a conscious conspiracy by a power
elite. 6 However, so far, political scientists have not adduced behavioral
evidence to support the hypothesis that court administrators have begun
to assume de facto leadership of judicial bureaucracies and to relegate
the formal judicial executives to a nominal role.
6. Judicial Selection and Tenure: Quality in Management
Because judicial management usually focuses on the operational
efficiency of courts, 7 one may doubt whether subjects-such as judicial
selection and tenure as well as judicial discipline, removal, and retire-
ment-fall within the ambit of this field. However, these topics are
germane if one posits, as Vanderbilt does, "a fundamental relation
between the quality of judges and the proper administration of jus-
tice.""8 On this basis these subjects constitute facets of judicial man-
agement and warrant at least brief review.
As a sixth facet of judicial management, judicial selection and
tenure entails consideration of three kinds of personnel for judicial
organizations: chief judges, judges, and staffs. (See Fig. 2.) A chief
judge of a trial court wields broad managerial powers-such as estab-
lishing such departments, divisions, or districts that he deems desir-
able; the supervision of the entire trial court; the delegation of
managerial authority to subordinates such as presiding judges for each
division; preparation and execution of a budget; maintenance of ade-
quate courtrooms, chambers, and office facilities; the initiation of
86 Galbraith, The New Industrial State, supra n.45 at 81-82. See also, C. Wright Mills,
The Power Elite 3-4, 228-231 (1956); Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure: Political
Process in American Society 41-42 (1967).
87 Vanderbilt, supra n.45 at 13; supra n.42 at 334-336.
88 Vanderbilt, supra n.28 at 3.
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studies pertaining to court business and management; the collection,
compilation, and analysis of statistical data about the operations of the
court; and liaison between the court and the various local governments,
police officials, bar associations, and civic groups."
Although this enumeration of managerial duties implies that a
chief judge is a powerful administrator, the selection system may not
necessarily assure this power and may create a divergence between his
authority (his right to give orders to subordinates) and his power (his
ability to do so).' For example, Illinois is a case in point. Under its
new judicial article, the judges and associate judges of each circuit are
authorized to select one of their members to serve at their pleasure as
chief judge, who will exercise general managerial authority over the
circuit court. 9 However, this selection system may render a chief judge
virtually powerless because, as a consequence of his dependence on his
colleagues for his position, he cannot carry out state supreme court
rules or his own rules opposed by his colleagues without running the
risk that they might replace him. This selection system undercuts not
only his power but also the ability of the state supreme court to manage
the entire judicial organization. Nevertheless, a chief judge may narrow
FiG. 6
JUDICIAL SELECTION MODES IN THE STATES (1969)92
Election by
Partisan Non-Partisan State Kales Appoint-
Year Elections Elections Legislatures Plan ment
Before 1900 13 7 3 0 7
1900-1909 3 0 1 0 2
1910-1919 3 2 0 0 1
1920-1929 0 0 0 0 0
1930-1939 0 1 0 1 0
1940-1949 2 1 0 1 4
1950-1959 3 3 1 2 2
1960-1969 6 5 0 5 13
Total States: 30 19 5 9 29
89 Supra n.56 at 3.
90 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 152 (A. Henderson
and T. Parsons transl. 1947); supra n.84 at 4-6; John M. Pfiffner and Frank Sherwood,
Administrative Organization 77 (1960).
91 Ill. Const. art VI, § 8 (1870); supra n.56 at 3. Associate judges possess all the
authority of circuit judges with two exceptions: First, associate judges cannot participate
in the appointment of magistrates. Second, associate judges cannot participate in the forma-
tion of circuit court rules.
92 Derived from 1-2 The Constitutions of the United States: National and State. Cu-
mulative Supplements.
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the gap between his authority and his power by his interpersonal skills
and by the indifference of his colleagues.
Because chief judges are also judges, one must turn to the modes
of selecting the latter. The various selection systems have ranged along
a continuum from a totally elective system at one end to a wholly ap-
pointive system at the other.93 (See Fig. 6.) Nine states have adopted
a compromise between these two poles: the Kales plan.94 (See Fig. 6.)
Under it a non-partisan commission of lawyers, judges, and laymen
submits to the governor a list of names from which he is to fill court
vacancies. Judges selected in this manner are periodically required to
seek subsequent popular election to their positions. However, in such
elections, incumbent judges may run without opposition. The only issue
for the voters to decide is whether an incumbent judge should be re-
tained in office. If such a judge is not retained, the governor is required
to appoint a replacement from the commission's list.95 This system tries
to apply an important tenet of traditional public administration (the
politics-administration dichotomy) to judicial organizations as much
as possible." However, this plan may simply replace partisan politics
with commission politics. At most, only a partial separation of such
organizations from partisan pressures is possible. In analyzing this
prospect, Stuart S. Nagel wrote:
Regardless of judicial tenure and modes of selection, there will
always be a residue of party-correlated judicial subjectivity so long as
political parties are at least value-oriented and so long as court cases
involve value-oriented controversies. Ultimately the problem becomes
not how to remove this irreducible residue of judicial subjectivity, but
rather what direction it [should] take.97
Most states employ different modes of judicial selection at differ-
ent levels of the state court system. Consequently, in twenty states,
there are two methods of judicial selection. Five states have relied on
93 Supra n.32 at 110-111.
94 Albert H. Kales, Unpopular Government in the United States 245-247 (1914). The
Kales plan of judicial selection and tenure is also commonly known by at least three other
names: the American Bar Association plan, the American Judicature Society plan, and the
hybrid plan. See also, Reports of the Section on Judicial Administration, 63 Ann. Rep. of
ABA 516-615; and Jack W. Peltason, The Missouri Plan for the Selection of Judges, 1945
U. Mo. St. 30.
95 See, e.g. Mo. Const. art. 5, § 29(d) (1945).
96 Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 16 Pol. Sci. Q. 494-495 (Dec. 1941);
Norton E. Long, Power and Administration, 9 Pub. Ad. Rev. 257-264 (Aut. 1949) ; Herbert
Simon, supra n.48 at 45-60.
97 Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 Am. PoL Sci.
Rev. 850 (1961).
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three modes of judicial selection. All together, the fifty states have em-
ployed, wholly or partly, different combinations of the following five
systems: partisan elections in thirty states, appointment in twenty-nine
states, non-partisan elections in nineteen states, the Kales plan in nine
states, and legislative elections in five states." (See Fig. 6.) Of these
five modes of judicial selection, partisan elections and appointment are
the oldest, whereas the Kales plan is the newest. 99
During the last decade political scientists have extensively re-
searched the subject of judicial selection and tenure at the state -- as
well as the federal-'-level. Furthermore, some academicians have
expanded this behavioral research to encompass the role of bar asso-
ciations in the selection of local trial judges." 2 However, very little is
empirically known about the causal connections, if any, between the
various methods of judicial selection and at least fifteen other salient
variables: the formal qualifications of judges, their informal (inter-
personal) qualifications, their social backgrounds, their ideological
outlooks, their ethnicity, their party identification, their pressure group
affiliations, their pre-judicial occupations, their ages, their education,
their urbanism, their regionalism, the turnover rate, their decisional
output, and their decision making process. 3 Empirical research into
98 Supra n.32 at 110-111.
99 Supra n.92.
100 See, e.g., Herbert Jacob, Judicial Insulation-Elections, Direct Participation and
Public Attention to the Courts in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 801 (1966); Jacob,
Justice in America, supra n.19 at 139, 203; Herbert Jacob, The Effect of Institutional Dif-
ferences in the Recruitment Process: the Case of State Judges, 13 J. Pub. L. 104
(1964) ; Herbert Jacob, The Courts as Political Agencies--a Historical Analysis, supra n.37
at 44-46.
101 See, e.g. Joel B. Grossman, Lawyers and Judges 2 (1965) ; Joel B. Grossman, Social
Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory, 29 J. Pol. 302-351 (1967);
Joel B. Grossman, Social Science Approaches to the Judicial Process, 79 Harv. L Rev. 1551-
1594 (1966); Joel B. Grossman, Federal Judicial Selection: the Work of the ABA
Committee; 8 MW. J. Pol. Sci. 221-254 (1964); Jack Ladinsky and Joel B. Grossman,
Organizational Consequences of Professional Consensus: Lawyers and Selection of Judges,
11 Ad. Sci. Q. 79-106 (1966); Harold W. Chase, Federal Judges: the Appointing
Process, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 185 (1966); Harold Chase, The Johnson Administration Judi-
cial Appointments-1963.1966, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 965 (1968).
102 Richard A. Watson, Rondal G. Downing, and Frederick C. Spiegel, Bar Politics,
Judicial Selection, and the Representation of Social Interests, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 54,71
(1967); Richard A. Watson and Rondall G. Downing, The Politics of the Bench and
the Bar: Judicial Selection Under the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan 2-3 (1969) ; Rich-
ard A. Watson, Bar Politics and Judicial Selection, 24 J. Mo. B. 27-38, 69-79; Richard A.
Watson, Lawyers' Attitudes on Judicial Selection, 72 Am. J. Soc. 373-387 (1967);
Richard A. Watson, Missouri Lawyers Evaluate the Merit Plan for Selection and Tenure of
Judges, 52 A.B.A.J. 539-542 (1966).
103 Supra n.97 at 848-850; Stuart S. Nagel, Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities,
24 J. Pol. 109 (1962); Stuart S. Nagel, Testing Relations between Judicial Charac-
teristics and Judicial Decision-Making, 15 W. Pol. Q. 435-437 (1962); Stuart S.
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these hypothesized linkages constitutes a substantial segment of the re-
search agenda for judicial management. In addition, political scientists
have failed to examine normative issues posed by judicial selection
and tenure systems-such as enumerating the specific traits of a good
judge and the precise attributes of good judicial candidates. However,
Joel B. Grossman points out:
Political scientists are not alone in their failure to specify the most de-
sirable attributes of a good judge, or the most necessary qualifications
for a prospective judge.... Though unable to specify desirable judicial
characteristics, political science is able to describe the attitudes toward
such characteristics held by individuals and groups.' 4
Finally, the selection of staff members is principally a task of
choosing members for the court administrator's offices, the staff agency
through which the state supreme court (or its chief justice) manages
the entire state judicial bureaucracy. Such offices are run by a director
and assistant directors, all of whom are appointed by the state supreme
court (or its chief justice) to serve at its (or his) pleasure.10 5 Further-
more, in some consolidated trial courts, the chief judge may appoint a
staff to facilitate his managerial duties.10'
7. Judicial Discipline, Removal, and Retirement: The Complements
of Judicial Selection and Tenure
A seventh facet of judicial management consists of judicial dis-
cipline, removal, and retirement. One may explore these three deeply
entwined subjects for the same reason that one treated the various
modes of judicial selection and tenure: the presumed linkage between
the quality of judges and the quality of court management."0 7 However,
whereas the literature on the sixth facet is extensive,' scholarly in-
terest in this last aspect has grown only since 1960.109 Only the Ameri-
can Judicature Society has given much consideration to the latter."0
Nagel, Culture Patterns and the Judicial System, 11 Vand. L Rev. 147 (1962); Stuart S.
Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. Crim. L. 335-338 (1962) ;
Stuart S. Nagel, Law and the Social Sciences: What Can Social Science Contribute? 51
A.B.AJ. 357 (1965). Nagel's works have suggested the fifteen variables to which
different modes of judicial selection and tenure may be correlated.
104 Grossman, Lawyers and Judges, supra n.101 at 197.
105 Supra n.32 at 119.
108 Supra n.76 at 24.
107 Vanderbilt, supra n.28 at 3.
10s Supra n. 100-103.
109 American Judicature Society, Judicial Discipline and Removal, August 1969. Report
No. 5. 1, 5, 22-23.
110 American Judicature Society, Judicial Retirement and Disability Commission and
Procedures 1-2 (1969).
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The subject of judicial discipline and removal consists of three
main issues. One is the determination of precise criteria for evaluating
judicial conduct. A corollary to this issue centers on which agency
should set these standards-the state supreme court, judicial councils,
judicial conferences, judicial qualifications commissions, the legisla-
ture, or bar associations."' Moreover, according to Richard A. Watson
and Rondal G. Downing, "a search of the literature indicates that very
few attempts have been made to develop methods of measuring judicial
performance.""'  Only within the last few years have some empirical
criteria for such measurement been suggested-such as the percentage
of lower-court decisions affirmed or reversed wholly or partly on ap-
peal, the volume of cases handled, judicial election returns, and bar
association evaluations." 3
A second issue focuses on increasing the methods of removing
judges apart from the traditional, cumbersome devices of impeach-
ment, address, and recall. In many instances a judge may be incompe-
tent rather than criminally culpable. Since 1947, the salient trend in
the states has been to add one of the following two devices: courts on
the judiciary or judicial qualifications commissions." 4 Under the
former, appellate and trial court judges probe into charges of miscon-
duct on the bench. So far twelve states have adopted this measure. (See
Fig. 7.) Under the latter, commissions of judges, lawyers, and laymen
perform the same function. Eighteen states have set up such commis-
sions with such measures under legislative consideration in fourteen
other states." 5 (See Fig. 7.)
A third issue gravitates around methods of disciplining, judges
short of removal. Proposed causes for such discipline include indo,
lence, refusal to carry out standard rules of procedure, inefficient use
of court time, failure to submit accurate output reports, arrogant con-
duct, and failure to render a decision shortly after a trial. Some sug-
gested sanctions have involved reassignment, private reprimand, public
reprimand, and temporary suspension without pay. Moreover, there is
no consensus on who should apply these proposed forms of judicial
Ill Selected Readings on Administration of Justice and Its Improvements, supra n.28
at 28-29.
112 Watson and Downing, supra n.19 at 273.
113 Id. at 274-277.
114 Supra n. 109-110.
115 Id.
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FIG. 7
METHODS OF JUDICIAL REMOVAL IN
THE STATES1l
Methods Number of States
(1) Impeachment 47
(2) Address 28
(3) Recall 6
(4) Courts on the Judiciary 12
(5) Judicial Qualifications
Commissions 18
(6) Special Commission for
Involuntary Retirement 5
punishment."' Finally, judicial retirement, when separated from dis-
cipline and removal, has encompassed three main problems: a manda-
tory retirement age for judges, possible uses of retired judges, and the
adequacy of pension plans." 8
V. CONCLUSIONS: THE PROSPECTS FOR JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
AT THE STATE LEVEL
Judicial management at the state level has remained a neglected
sector of law, political science, and public administration despite its
growing significance. At least three enduring factors may reduce this
neglect: the sheer size of the state trial courts, the magnitude of their
output, and their pervasive impact on public policy. Each factor has
helped to publicize serious shortcomings in the operations of judicial
organizations, especially at the state level. However, it is unlikely that
most of these failures will be remedied because most of the dissatis-
faction is exhibited by segments of the legal profession rather than by
the general public." 9 For judicial management at this level, there are
at least seven facets: court organization (or consolidation); abolition
of fee offices; judicial leadership; court congestion; judicial staff func-
tions; judicial selection and tenure; and judicial discipline, removal,
and retirement. In considering the prospects for judicial management,
especially at the state level, let us center on three issues: its relation to
the general goals of a judicial system, its cohesion as a sector of these
three fields, and its research agenda.
116 Based on supra n.109.
117 Supra n.11L.
11s Id. at 30.
119 Jacob, Justice in America, supra n.18 at 203.
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(1) These seven facets of judicial management have often been
examined as if they were simply technical devices and ends in them-
selves.120 Moreover, scholars have neglected to explore possible rela-
tionships between these facets and the general goals of a judicial
system, although they have written about each area separately. 21 There
is a general consensus among academicians that a judicial system op-
erates to achieve at least eight principal overlapping goals :122
1. The formulation and enforcement of common morality
2. Impartiality in such enforcement
3. Efficiency (or competence) in such enforcement
4. Preservation of substantial individual liberty
5. Limiting the scope of lawful governmental conduct
6. Peaceful resolution of differences among competing interests in
society
7. Order (or stability)
8. Promotion of the social welfare
The first five goals were enumerated in a descending order of
abstraction-from general to specific. The last three goals are probably
by-products of accomplishing the first five. Recently Herbert Jacob suc-
cinctly interrelated most of these goals; for he commented:
The administration of justice is essential to an ordered society.
What is generally meant by administration of justice is that norms are
enforced in an even-handed way so that the same standards are applied
to all citizens. Every society has norms of behavior that it enforces....
Ordinary citizens must be protected in their peaceable pursuits, yet they
must be prevented from harming others. . . . The manner in which
judges apply legal norms gives them an influential voice in molding
the norms. 123
A salient task facing scholars is to measure the extent to which
the facets of judicial management help to realize the general goals of
a judicial system. Despite a lack of empirical data specifying connec-
tions between these aspects and objectives, one may still speculate
120 Supra n.27, n.28, n.68.
121 id. (for some sources focusing on facets of judicial management.) For some sources
focusing on the general goals of a judicial system, see Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of
the Judicial Process 67, 72 (1921) ; David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life
264-265 (1965) ; Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 135, 137 (1940); Lon L. Fuller,
The Morality of Law, 41-94 (1964); H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality 1-6 (1963);
H.LA. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 2 (1968);
James Herndon, The Role of the Judiciary in State Political Systems, Judicial Behavior: A
Reader in Theory and Research 156, 158 (G. Schubert ed. 1964) ; Jacob, Justice in America,
supra n.19 at 17-25; R.L. Meek, The Distribution of Justice, Politics of Local Justice, supra
n.12 at 20-24; Edwin M. Schur, Law and Society 17, 152 (1968); supra n.18 at 313-326.
122 Id.
128 Jacob, Justice in America, supra n.19 at 17, 23.
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briefly about some possible nexus. For instance, court organization (or
consolidation) is most likely to promote efficiency. The abolition of fee
offices helps to achieve not only the same goal but also the peaceful
resolution of differences. Judicial leadership contributes to the accom-
plishment of impartiality as well as efficiency. Devices for reducing
trial court delay offer the same advantages as judicial leadership be-
cause the former constitutes a central function of the latter. Similarly,
staffs (court administrator's offices) probably increase efficiency. Fi-
nally, modes of judicial selection as well as procedures for judicial
discipline, removal, and retirement-probably in widely differing
degrees-promote all these goals.
(2) Scholars Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus contend that a
discipline has three main characteristics: a certain state of mind, a
formal organization, and a gallery of notables.'24 By this definition,
judicial management may qualify as a discipline. Its state of mind
regards judicial organizations as essentially like all other forms of
bureaucracy and as merely another species of the same genus. There-
fore, judicial organizations encounter the same kinds of interrelated
problems facing other public as well as corporate organizations-such
as specialization; delegation; unity of command; span of control;
layering; different bases for organization (purpose, process, place, and
clientele); staff functions; budgeting; work measurement; data pro-
cessing; personnel selection; leadership; and human relations. Judicial
management also possesses two kinds of formal organizations. One
kind consists of a body of knowledge with regard to its seven principal
facets. The other kind consists of associations unique to this area-
such as the American Judicature Society,'25 and the Institute of Judi-
cial Administration.' 26 Finally, this field contains a gallery of notables
-such as Roscoe Pound, the first prominent exponent of court consoli-
dation;127 Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the first chief justice to manage a
statewide consolidated court system;12 Albert M. Kales, an innovator
124 Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, American Political Science: A Profile of a
Discipline 2-6 (1964).
125 The American Judicature Society, 1155 East 60th Str. Third Floor, Chicago, Illi.
nois 60637.
126 The Institute of Judicial Administration, New York University, 40 Washington
Square So. New York, New York, 10012.
127 Pound, supra n.9, at 62-63.
128 Vanderbilt, supra n.45 at 13; NJ. Const. art. 6, § 1 (1948).
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in judicial selection ;..9 Glenn R. Winters, a thorough chronicler of this
field for the American Judicature Society;... and a series of scholars
who impressionistically or empirically illuminated the many ramifi-
cations of judicial decision making: Benjamin Cardozo,"'3 Jerome
Frank,'32 Rodney Mott,' Charles Herman Pritchett," 4 Glendon Schu-
bert, ' John Schmidhauser,'36 S. Sidney Ulmer, 13 7 Stuart S. Nagel,138
and Walter F. Murphy." 9 Judicial management may have enough of
each characteristic to be called a discipline. It certainly qualifies as
a significant sector within law, political science, and public admin-
istration.
(3) The neglect of judicial management by specialists implies
that the research agenda for this sector is substantial; even the wide-
spread establishment of court administrator's offices facilitates such
research. Let us briefly review the research agenda for the seven main
facets of this field.
In the area of court consolidation, the prime task of researchers
is to measure its impact, if any, on trial court congestion. Researchers
will encounter difficulty in isolating such consolidation from other
variables-such as improved leadership, better staffs, more personnel,
and more facilities. Scholars may want to compare the perceptions of
judges, lawyers, and law professors about the efficacy of such consoli.
dation with the objective data on the caseloads. Survey and statistical
research will be most helpful in this area. 4'
In the area of fee offices, analysts face two main tasks: to measure
the extent to which these offices contribute to trial court congestion and
129 Kales, supra n.94 at 245-247.
180 Selected Readings on Administration of Justice and Its Improvement, supra n.28
at 71-82.
131 Cardozo, supra n.121 at 19-25.
132 Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, supra n.11 at 108-126; Frank, Courts on Trial:
The Myth and Reality of American Justice, supra n.11 at 316-325.
133 Rodney L. Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 295-315 (1936).
134 Charles Herman Prictchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Politics and Values,
1937-1947 32-45, 89, 242-263. (1948).
1385 Glendon A. Schubert, The Judicial Mind, 273-288 (1965).
186 John R. Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court: Its Politics, Personalities, and Pro.
cedures 30-59 (1960).
137 S. Sidney Ulmer, An Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme
Court, 22 J. Pol. 629-653 (1960).
138 Supra n.97 and n.103.
139 Murphy supra n.11 at 91-122.
140 Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics 33-34 (1963).
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to compare the costs of a fee office system with those of a consolidated
court structure in order to determine the relative worth of each one.
The research techniques applicable to the area of court consolidation
are also germane to this area.141
In the area of judicial leadership, specialists confront the largest
number of major tasks with the widest number of research instruments.
At least six main research problems loom: to delineate empirically the
functions of the judicial executive, to compare his functions with those
of other executives, to determine leadership styles, to analyze the
efficacy of various managerial stratagems, to explore further the nature
of judicial decision making in the handling of cases and managerial
problems, and to compare the decision-making processes of judges
with those of other executives."' The composite of methodologies
germane to the other two areas are also useful in this area along with
two other approaches: the participant observer technique and case
studies.143
In the areas of judicial congestion, scholars face two difficult
problems: first, to formulate a universal, operational definition of de-
lay in order to make possible the comparison of backlog data from the
numerous trial court jurisdictions and, second, to test the numerous
proposed solutions or palliatives for such delay under rigorous labo-
ratory conditions in order to measure the effectiveness of each proposal.
Theoretically, most experimental designs would make such testing
possible.1'4 However, Zeisel and his colleagues perceive what is proba-
bly an insurmountable barrier to this approach; for they comment:
The most precise way of measuring the differential effects of alternative
solutions for an administrative problem is the controlled experiment.
Since it involves the inclusion of randomly selected cases in the experi-
ment, and the exclusion of others, the official legal experiment poses a
problem of equal treatment under the law.
145
141 Id.
142 Joseph Tanenhaus, Supreme Court Attitudes toward Federal Administrative Agen-
cies, 1947-1956--An Application of Social Science Methods to the Study of the Judicial
Process, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 473-502 (1961) ; Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling
Through, 19 Publ. Ad. Rev. 79-88 (1959).
143 Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic
Society 30-41 (1967).
144 Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research 275-355 (1964) ; John Ross
and Perry Smith, Orthodox Experimental Designs Methodology in Social Research 352-363
(H. Blalock and A. Blalock ed. 1968).
145 Supra n.55 at 241.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW' REVIEW
Therefore, in lieu of such experimentation, researchers may have to
rely on such surrogates as simulations, participant observer work, and
survey research.'46
In the area of staff functions, the primary task of analysts is to
examine the interactions of the formal judicial leadership and court
administrators in order to ascertain whether the latter is assuming de
facto leadership because of expertise and indispensability. If a judicial
technostructure exists, a second task will result: to compare it with
other technostructures. In this area the most helpful techniques may be
simulations and case studies. 47
In the area of judicial selection and tenure, the central problem
for specialists is to measure the inputs and outputs of each selection
and tenure system. More specifically, scholars will have to correlate
each mode of selection and tenure with at least fifteen other salient
variables: the formal qualifications of judges, their informal qualifi-
cations, their social backgrounds, their ideological proclivities, their
ethnicity, their party identification, their pressure group connections,
their pre-judicial employment, their outputs, their ages, their educa-
tion, their urbanism, their regionalism, turnover rates, and their
decision making modes. Among the methodologies applicable to this
area are factor analysis, Guttman, correlations, and simulations. 4 '
In the area of judicial discipline, removal, and retirement, re-
searchers confront three prime issues: formulating empirical criteria
for measuring judicial conduct, gauging the effectiveness of the various
devices for removing judges from office, and determining the efficacy
of the numerous disciplinary options short of removal. The method-
ologies applicable to the previous area also fit this one.'49
Finally, among the areas for further research in judicial manage-
ment are the following three: ecology, systems, and small groups.
Ecology confronts analysts with at least two main problems: to measure
the impact of intra-and-extra-cultural forces on judicial organizations
and to compare such entities cross culturally.6 0 Systems entails the
146 Supra nn. 136-138.
147 Tanenhaus, supra n.142 at 473-475.
148 Supra n.135-137.
149 Id.
150 See, e.g. Max Gluckman, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern
Rhodesia 357-366 (1955) ; Paul Bohannon, Justice and Judgment Among the TWI 208-214
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study of judicial organizations as circuits with inputs, outputs, and
feedback and as inputs or outputs of a larger system. For these two
overlapping problems, survey research, simulations, and participant
observer techniques are among the relevant methodologies. 5 ' Small
group research focuses on the informal norms and sanctions governing
the behavior of judges. Even though small group research entails study
at a microlevel rather than at the macrolevel of the other two areas, the
methodologies overlap.' 52
(1957); Victor Ayoub, Review: the Judicial Process in Two African Tribes, Community
Political Systems 237-250 (M. Janowitz ed. 1961).
151 Tanenhaus, supra n.142 at 473-475.
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